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Abstract 
The greater numbers of internet users the greater challenge will be tackled by ISP to provide 
good services but gain maximum profit. By analyzing Cobb-Douglass utility function we will obtain optimal 
pricing scheme. This research is based on previous research conducted by [1]. Wu and Banker [1] 
analyzed modified Cobb-douglass utility function and obtained optimal model of flat fee and two part tariff 
for homogen consumers meanwhile we focus on getting optimal pricing scheme model by using original 
Cobb-Douglass utility function. The first step to conduct this research is by formulating Cobb-Douglass 
utility function then analyzing that function. The results show that we obtain optimal pricing scheme model 
for homogenous and heterogeneous consumer cases. The two-part tariff pricing scheme yield better 
optimal solution rather than flat fee and two-part tariff pricing scheme regarding with homogen consumers 
and heterogen consumers based on willingness to pay. For heterogeneous consumers based on 
consumption level, the optimal pricing scheme is on two-part tariff pricing scheme. 
  
Keywords: original Cobb-Douglass utility function, homogenous consumers, heterogeneous consumers 
  
 
1. Introduction 
Nowadays, internet development increases fast so this condition increases the users to 
use the internet.  Internet Service Provider (ISP) has to provide best services with optimal prices 
for the consumers. ISP needs not the best utility function not only to gain profit for itself but also 
to pursue the consumers applying the service provided by ISP. Previous works regarding the 
pricing strategies to maximize the ISP profit are due to [2, 3]. According to [4], the utility function 
usually connects with level of consumer satisfaction to information service consumption which 
can maximize the profit to achieve certain objectives.  
There is a lot of assumption to be applied to the utility function but the researchers 
usually use the bandwidth function with fixed loss and delay and follow the rules that marginal 
utility as bandwidth function diminishing with increasing bandwidth [5-15]. The other reason 
dealing with the choices of utility function is that the utility function should be differentiable and 
easily to be analyzed the homogeneity and heterogeneity that impacts the choice of pricing 
structure for the companies. Kelly [16] also contends that the utility function also can be 
assumed to be increasing function, strictly concave and continuously differentiable. 
There exist some utility functions, but we need the utility function that can fulfill 
consumer satisfactions. Previous work on utility function is due to [1]. In their explanation, the 
results show that flat fee and two-part tariff pricing scheme yield the optimal solutions using the 
modified Cobb-Douglass utility function.  
The contribution of this paper basically is to analyze the original Cobb-Douglass utility function 
to obtain optimal solution of information service pricing scheme. The optimal solutions can be 
different from what the previous work done by previous researches in terms of the utility function 
chosen and the analysis in finding the best of three pricing strategies.  Comparison of the 
results between original utility function and modified will be conducted to observe which utility 
function offers best maximum prices to consumers. 
 
 
2. Research Method 
 The steps in conducting the research are as follows. 
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1. Apply the original Cobb-Douglas utility function on three internet pricing schemes  which are 
flat fee, usage-based and two-part tariff for homogen and heterogen consumers that 
previously described by [1]. 
2. Analyze the utility function forms analytically.  
3. Compare the obtained model analysis of those three pricing schemes. 
4. Compare the obtained model analysis using original Cobb-Douglas utility function with 
modified Cobb-Douglas utility function proposed by [1]. 
5. Conclude and obtain the optimal model of information service pricing scheme. 
 
 
3. Results and Analysis 
The parameter and decision variables are adopted in [1, 17]. We use the original Cobb-
Douglass as follows. 
 
 ,    
 
The following are the analysis of Cobb-Douglass utility function for three pricing 
strategies. The analysis follows the steps of [1].  
 
 
3.1 Homogen Consumer 
Consumers Optimization problem (adopted in [1]) 
 
, ,  (1) 
 
Such that 
 
 (2) 
 
 (3) 
 
0 (4) 
 
0   1 (5) 
 
ISP optimization problem: 
 
, , ∑
∗ ∗ ∗          (6) 
 
where (X*,Y*,Z*) = argmaks    
such that Constraint (3)-(5) 
We proceed to Lemma 1a-9a as the lemma improved from [1] using original Cobb 
Douglass utility function. 
 
Case 1a. if providers apply the flat fee rate by setting up 0,  0  dan 0, it means that 
the price set up by providers does not have an impact to time usage (peak or nonpeak hours) 
so, our homogenous optimization problem will be  
 
, ,
  0 0 1      
 
Using Eq. (4), we obtain 0 ⇔  
 
Then the provider problem will be 
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 max , ,  ∑
∗ ∗ ∗ ∑ 0 ∗ 0 ∗ 1  ∑ 0 ∗ 0 ∗
1                                                 
 
When the function can maximize X,Y, and Z then the consumers will fully utilize the 
services by choosing consumption level  dan   , which is maximum usage level with 
maximum utility, so that the consumer can get the price . Maximum flat fee rate provider 
can charge is   with maximum profit of ∑ ; where  i shows the number of 
consumers. According to this case, we obtain the Lemma 1a. 
  
Lemma 1a: If the providers apply flat fee rate, then the charges will be  and maximum 
profit obtained will be ∑ ;    where  i shows the number of consumers.  
 
Case 2a. If the providers apply the pure usage base price by setting up  0,  0  and 
0 then the providers give different prices which are peak and nonpeak hour prices.  Given 
the function 
, ,
. To maximize that function we will apply necessary and 
sufficient conditions as follows.  
 
(i) The necessary condition. 0, so        (7) 
 
 ⇔     ⇔   ∗                                                               
 
(ii) The sufficient condition: 
 
0 ⇔ 
 
1   0 ; , 0  
 
 It means that      is minimum price. 
and 
(i) The necessary condition. 0, so           (8)   
 
⇔        ⇔   ∗                                           
 
(ii) The sufficient condition: 0  
 
⇔ 
 
1   0 ; , 0  
 
It means that      is minimum price. 
Then the provider problem will be 
 
max
, ,
∗ ∗    
 
   ∑
       
  ∑
 
   
  11   1 1 1 1 1  
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   ∑
   
 
   
 
   
 
               
 
   ∑       ∑   
 
It means that if the service provider wants to maximize their profit, they have to 
minimize  and . Since   and , then ∗  and ∗   . So optimal   and  will 
be    and    with maximum profit of ∑  ; where i shows 
the number of consumers. According to this case, we obtain the Lemma 2a. 
 
Lemma 2a: If the provider would like to apply usage-based pricing scheme then the optimal 
price will be    and    with maximum profit of ∑  ; where 
i shows the number of consumers. 
 
Case 3a. The providers apply the two-part tariff price by setting up 0,  0  and 0, it 
means that we have subscription fee if the consumers choose this service and the prices is 
during the peak and nonpeak hours.  
By using the Eq. (8) and (9), substitute those equations into Eq. (4) which is the 
constraint of consumer optimization problem. So, the constraint will be  
 
     0 ⇔     0  
 
⇔     0   ⇔         
 
 
The provider optimization problem will be 
 
max , , ∑
∗ ∗ ∗    
 
∑       
 
  ∑
       
      
 
 
           
     
 
   ∑
   
 
   
 
 
     
 
 ∑
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   ∑            ∑    
 
Since we know that  and  decrease, then X* and Y* will increase. However, since 
  and , then ∗  and ∗   . In other words, optimal  and  yang will be 
    ,      and     . That is why, the maximum 
profit achievable of service provider is ∑   ; where  i shows the number of consumers. 
According to this case we obtain Lemma 3a. 
If we assume that    and   , then ; 
, 0. So, the maximum profit obtained by ISP will be when they apply  usage-based pricing 
scheme.  
 
Lemma 3a: If the service providers apply two-part tariff scheme, the best   and  will be 
    ,     . Maximum fixed value P ISPs provide is the differences between 
consumer maximum that can be obtained, , and payment for utilizing the service, 
. So, the maximum profit for ISP will be 1    where i shows the number of 
consumers. 
 
 
3.2. High End and Low End Heterogeneous Consumers  
Assume that we have m high end consumers (i = 1) and n low end consumers    (i = 2). 
To learn how the willingness to pay affects the pricing scheme, we assume that each 
consumers have the same upper bound in during peak hours and Y during nonpeak hours, 
  dan .  
 
Consumer optimization problem will be: 
 
Max  , ,    
 
                         (9) 
 
Such that 
                         (10) 
 
        (11) 
      0        (12) 
 
0   1                  (13) 
 
Provider optimization problem will be: 
 
Max  ,  ,   X
∗   Y ∗   Z ∗     X ∗   Y ∗   Z ∗   (4.14) 
 
with X ∗, Y ∗, Z ∗  argmax         
 
such that 
                    
 
     
 
      0                  
 
0 or 1    
 
We discuss the way to determine the maximum profit for each pricing scheme provided 
by service provider.  
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Case 4a. If the providers use the pure flat fee price by setting up 0,  0  and 0, it 
means that the price that price that providers use will not affect the consumption time (peak and 
off peak hours),  then the consumers can select maximum level of consumption   , 
  ,   , and    . So, each high level consumer will be charged        and low 
level consumer is of      . The case 4a is flat fee scheme so P or its price is referred to 
both heterogeneous consumer types. If we set up     then the prices for high level 
consumers will follow the prices for low level consumers       ⇔         ,      ⇔
        
Assume that        . it means, if    , than only the high 
level consumers can adopt this service. If   , then both consumers can adopt this 
service. So, to maximize the profit, the providers will charge  . 
So, the providers optimization problem will be: 
Maks       Z
∗     Z ∗                      =           
So the attainable maximum profit of providers will be         ; m is the 
number of high level consumers and n is low level consumers. According to this case, we obtain 
Lemma 4a. 
 
Lemma 4a:If the service providers apply flat fee scheme, then the price that providers can 
charge is     with attainable maximum profit of       . 
 
Case 5a. if the providers use usage-based scheme by setting up 0,  0  and 0, it 
means that the providers use differentiation prices, peak price and nonpeak price. Then: 
The optimization problem of high end heterogeneous consumers will be: 
 
Maks  , ,  
   –      (15) 
 
To optimize the price we use the necessary and sufficient conditions:  
 
(i) For necessary condition 
   –   
0, then from the differential process 
we obtain: 
 
             ⇔         ⇔
∗
 
                 (16) 
(ii) Sufficient condition. 
   –   
0 
 
 ⇔  
       
      1     0;  ,   0 
 
It means that       is minimum price and 
 
(i) Necessary condition. 
   –   
0, from the differential result we 
have : 
            ⇔         ⇔
∗
 
   (17) 
 
(ii) Sufficient condition 
 
  
   –   
0 ⇔
        
    1       0;  
 
 ,   0 
 
It means that          is minimum price. 
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The optimization problem of low end heterogeneous consumers will be: 
  
Maks  , ,      –    . 
 
To optimize the prices we use the necessary and sufficient condition as follows.  
(i) The necessary condition 
 
   –   
0, from the differential result we have: 
 
          ⇔      
 
 
 ⇔ ∗
 
        (18) 
 
(ii) The sufficient condition 
 
 
   –   
0 ⇔
       –         1     0; 
 
 ,   0 
 
It means that       is minimum price and 
(i) The necessary condition 
 
  
   –   
0, from the differential result we have: 
 
          ⇔      
 
 
⇔ ∗  
 
  (19) 
 
(ii) The sufficient condition 
 
    
   –   
0 ⇔
       
    1       0 
 ,   0 
It means that        is minimum price. 
This analysis can be applied to peak hour and off peak problems.  
(i) For problem during peak hours : 
The providers should minimize ;      to maximize objective function 
(15). On the other, if the providers already set up the price      , then 
the profit is not optimal if   * ≤  or   * ≤ . So, the best price  will be 
 
              . 
(ii) For problem during off peak hours: 
The providers should minimize ;      , to maximize objective 
function (15). On the other hand, if the providers set up       , then 
there is no optimal profit if   * ≤  atau   * ≤ . So, the best  price is 
 
             .  
When the price is in interval                  and      
         , the demand of high end consumers will still remain at a  and , meanwhile 
the demand of low end consumers will increase gradually since the price goes down. So, both 
consumers (high end and low end) can apply this service with optimal price for peak hour is 
        and the off peak hour optimal price will be       . 
The provider optimization problem will be: 
 
Maks  ,     X
∗   Y ∗   X ∗   Y ∗  
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The optimal price for peak hour will be          and off peak hour optimal 
price will be         with maximum profit of       . According to 
this case, we obtain Lemma 5a. 
 
Lemma 5a: If the provider use usage-based price, then the optimal price for peak hour will be 
        and off peak hour optimal price will be         with maximum 
profit of       .  
 
Case 6a. If the providers use two-part tariff then 0, 0, and 0. First order condition 
to optimization problem of high end/low end consumers is by using Eq.(16)-(19). Eq.(16) and 
(18) are high end consumer demand curve and low consumer in peak hour. Eq. (17) and (19) 
are the demand curves of high end and low end consumers during off peak hour. If     
then high end price will follow the low end price, then            ⇔    
    
It means that the consumers will be charge of       ,        and 
   –         , then high end consumers will adopt this service. If the 
consumers price are       ,               and        –    
2  2 2  2 2, then both consumers can adopt this scheme. This is due to many consumers 
see that subscription fee as barrier entry, then the providers can select to decrease this barrier 
entry to attract consumer’s attention. Then to maximize the profit, the providers charge  
 
 
    ,           and    –       . 
 
The provider optimization problem will be: 
 
Maks  ,    
∗   ∗ ∗     ∗   ∗ ∗  
 
 
   
 
     –        
                 –          
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Lemma 6a: If the providers use two-part tariff scheme, optimal  and   will be      , 
 
    , and    –       , with attainable maximum profit of 
  .If         and     then        
        ;    ,   0. That is why, if there exist two type of consumers based on 
willingness to pay then the usage-based price is better than flat fee and two-part tariff schemes. 
So, the usage based price always benefits and dominates the pure flat-fee and two-part tariff 
schemes. For high end and low end consumers based on willingness to pay, the providers 
should set up prices that encourage the consumers to consume much. If the set up price follows 
for high end consumers then the providers will lose the low end consumers.  If the set up price 
follows the low end consumers, then both consumers can adopt the scheme.  
 
3.3. High Demand and Low Demand Heterogeneous Consumers 
For example, we assume that there exist two types of consumers which are high 
demand consumers (type 1) with maximum consumption level of  and  and low demand 
consumers (type 2) with maximum level of consumption  and . There are m consumer of 
type 1 dan n consumer of type 2 with  and . 
The discussion  about to obtain the maximum profit for each pricing scheme applied by 
providers is as follows (follows from [1]). 
 
Case 7a. If the providers would like to apply flat-fee scheme then providers will set up  
0,   0  and   0. it means that this scheme will have price if high and low demand 
consumers choose to join the scheme then the consumers will fully utilize the scheme by 
choosing the consumption level of    ,     or    ,     with maximum utility 
 or  (high and low level consumers, respectively). Then, the providers will give a 
price to each high consumption level consumers of  and each low level consumer 
which is not more than as flat fee service. Since we assume that the providers 
cannot differentiate the high and low level demand consumers and have to charge the same 
price for both consumers then the providers should set  by only serving the high level 
demand consumers or fixing the price  to serve two type of consumers.  If we 
assume that , then the providers can set up  and 
serve both consumers with attainable maximum profit of  . According to this 
case we proceed to Lemma 7a. 
 
Lemma 7a : if the providers use the flat fee scheme, then the fixed price will be  with 
the attainable maximum profit of . 
 
Case 8a. if the providers use usage based scheme by setting up 0, 0, and 0, then 
the providers provide the differentiation prices which are peak and off peak hours. First order 
conditions for optimality of consumers of high and low demand level will be 
For high demand level consumers:  
 
Maks  , ,    –     
 
To optimize the prices we use the necessary and sufficient conditions as follows.  
 
(i) Necessary condition. 
   –   
0. From that differensial, we have 
 
       ⇔   ∗  
 
       (20) 
 
(ii) Sufficient condition 
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   –   
0 ⇔
   
  1   0; , 0  
 
and 
(i) Necessary condition 
 
 –   
0. From that differensial, we have 
 
             ⇔   ∗       (21) 
 
(iii) Sufficient condition 
 
 
 –   
 
0 ⇔
 
1 0; , 0 
 
For low level heterogeneous consumers: 
 
Max  , ,   –     
 
To optimize the prices we use the necessary and sufficient conditions as follows.  
(i) Necessary condition 
 
 
–   
0. From that differensial, we have 
 
    ⇔   ∗         (22) 
 
(ii) Sufficient condition 
 
 
–   
0 ⇔
 
  1 0; , 0 and 
(i) Necessary condition 
 
–   
0. From that differensial, we have 
 
     ⇔   ∗        (23) 
 
If we assume that , then the providers can fix      and 
       which serve high and low consumption level consumers.  
The provider optimization problem will be 
 
 Max  ,     X
∗   Y ∗     X ∗   Y ∗                 
 
         
 
 
 
 
It is given that as long as  and  decrease, then  ∗, ∗, ∗ and Y ∗ will increase. 
However, since , ,   and  are subjected to , ,  and  then the best  and  will be 
     dan     with attainable maximum profit  
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 .    
 
 
.    
 
 
   
 
So, if the providers use the pure usage-based scheme, then the peak hour optimal 
prices will be    and in off peak hours will be    with attainable maximum 
profit of . According to this case we obtain Lemma 8a. 
 
Lemma 8a : If the providers apply usage based price, then the peak hour optimal price will be 
   
    and the off peak hour optimal price will be    
   . The maximum 
profit is .  
 
Kasus 9a. if the providers use Jika two-part tariff, 0, 0, and 0, the first order 
condition for optimization of high end/low end consumers is by using Eq. (20)-(23). 
It is known that         ⇔              , the best           fixed 
by the providers. Then the high and low level consumption consumers can adopt. If they use 
     , then the providers can only attract the high level demand consumers only. It 
occurs also for off peak hour price,      
   is the best off peak hour price.  
By using Eq.(15) , we have 
 
    0 ⇔                
     0 
 
⇔             0   ⇔               
 
karena  ∗    dan ∗ , maka       
 
 
The optimization problem of the provider will be  
 
 
 Max  ,  , X
∗   Y ∗   Z ∗     X ∗   Y ∗   Z ∗   
 
          
              
 
       
            
 
           
      
 
It means that the providers use two-part tariff scheme by setting up  0, 0, and 
0, then the providers can determine the optimal price    ,    , and 
subscription fee P which equals to low level consumers surplus, so we can obtain maximum 
profit of   . According to this 
case, we obtain Lemma 9a. 
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If 0 and  0, then                                
             .  So, two-part tariff scheme 
offers better price compared to pure flat fee and pure usage-based scheme for high demand 
and low demand heterogeneous consumers.   
 
Lemma 9a: If the providers use two part tariff scheme, optimal  and   will be  dan 
, respectively and     . So, the attainable profit of 
providers will be      that is 
larger price compared to attainable price by flat-fee or usage-based scheme.  
 
The comparison between original Cobb-Douglass with modified Cobb Douglass 
proposed in [1] is presented in Table 1 as follows. The analysis to seek for the advantage of 
using original Cobb-Douglass is explained as follows. 
1. For Homogenous Consumers, if we assume that 
a.   log 1 ; 0 then   1  ⇔ log   1 . 
b.   log 1 ; 0 then     1  ⇔ log   1 . 
So,   1     1  
We obtain maximum profit by adopting original Cobb-Douglass.  
 
2. For High-End dan Low-End Heterogeneous Consumers 
If we assume that 
a.       log 1 ;   0,       log 1  ⇔ log  
 
  1    
 
b.     log 1  ;   0 then     log 1  ⇔ log  
  1    
 
So we obtain         log 1   log 1  and obtain maximum profit 
by adopting original Cobb-Douglass. 
 
3. For High-Demand dan Low-Demand Heterogeneous Consumers 
I we assume that 
a. ; 0 then log 1 ; 0 
 
⇔   
1
 ⇔    
1
1
⇔    
1
 
 
⇔     ⇔  . Next,  
 
log 1  ⇔ log log   1  
 
b.   ; 0 then   log 1 ; 0 
 
⇔   
1
 ⇔    
1
1
⇔    
1
⇔    
1
 
 
⇔  
1
 
 
  log 1 ⇔ log   log   1  
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We have    
    log 1   log 1  
 
Again, we obtain maximum profit by using Cobb-Douglass utility function. 
 
 
Table 1. Comparison between Original Cobb-Douglass and Modified Cobb-Douglass 
Consumer type  Original Cobb-Douglass Modified Cobb-Douglass 
 Standard form 
 
 
log 1  
log 1  
 
Homogen 
 
 
 
Pricing Scheme Usage-Based Flat-Fee atau Two-Part Tariff 
Consumer Price and  log 1   log 1  
Maximum profit for 
provider 
 log 1   log 1  
 
Heterogen High-
End dan Low-
End 
Pricing Scheme Usage-Based Flat-Fee atau Two-Part Tariff 
Consumer Price 
 and    log 1  
    log 1  
Maximum profit for 
provider 
 
  
 
log 1     log 1  
 
Heterogen High-
Demand dan 
Low-Demand 
Pricing Scheme Two-part tariff Two-part tariff 
Consumer Price and   and   
Maximum profit for 
provider 
2 −1 1− 2 2 2   
1
1
log 1
log 1  
 
 
4. Conclusion 
The main purpose of this paper is to aid ISP to determine the best strategy to be offered 
to consumers with optimal prices. The previous work done by researchers does not solve the 
problem of pricing strategy when ISP adopt flat fee and usage based scheme with or without 
subscription fee. 
We found that the marginal and monitoring prices can be neglected for monopoly 
supplier with homogen consumers, pure usage based price is better than fat fee and two-part 
tariff since supplier gets maximum profit. 
In case of heterogeneous marginal supply based on the willingness to pay, the usage 
based price can extract all low end consumer surpluses and leave the surplus only for high-end 
consumer if it is in company’s benefit to serve the consumer. However, the flat-fee and two-part 
tariff prices can only extract all surpluses from low-end consumers.  
If we compare to modified Cobb-Douglass proposed by [1] by using original Cobb-
Douglass, we obtain maximum profit using the original Cobb-Douglass in some cases including 
pricing strategy, consumer price and maximum profit obtained by providers. 
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